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Military Law-Court-Martial-Double Jeopardy-[Federal].-In i918 the petitioner was convicted of rape by a court-martial and sentenced to death. On the grounds
that the trial had been hasty and that the petitioner had been inadequately represented
by counsel, the President refused to confirm the sentence' and ordered a new trial.
The second court-martial,2 denying the prisoner's plea of double jeopardy, imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment. Twenty years later the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been twice placed in jeopardy. The district court
granted the petition.3 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
held, that the second court-martial properly denied the plea of double jeopardy. judgment reversed. Sanford v. Robbilts.4
Absence of authorization in the Articles of War for a particular action of a courtmartial has been held to constitute such lack of jurisdiction as to require the granting
of a writ of habeas corpus.5 The court in the instant case, in limiting its inquiry to the
question of whether the second court-martial proceeding constituted a violation of the
constitutional prohibition of "double jeopardy," appears to have overlooked the preliminary question of whether the President had authority to order a new trial under the
Articles of War.
At the time of the court-martial proceedings, the President was without specific
statutory authority to order a new trial; nor had the then existing statutes been interpreted as authorizing such a procedure. The reviewing authority had power to send
the case back to the court of first instance for corrections of a nature not requiring a
new trial, such as changing the sentence to conform with the findings, or revising the
I It is a characteristic feature of military law that sentences of courts-martial cannot be
executed until they are approved by the officer appointing the court or by the officer commanding certain higher tactical units. Article of War 46, 39 stat. 657 (1916). Death
sentences and certain other decisions, in addition to "approval," need also "confirmation by
the President," with certain exceptions, none of which was applicable to the instant case,
being provided for time of war. Article of War 48, 39 Stat. 658 (i9i6). See Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 448, 459 (2d ed. 1920). As a result of criticisms following the last
war (see Ansell, Military Justice, 5 Corn. L. Q. i (i919); Bogert, Courts-Martial: Criticisms
and Reforms, 5 Corn. L. Q. i8 (i919)), the rules concerning approval and confirmation of
court-martial decisions have been amended in important respects by acts of 1920. 41 Stat. 795,
797, io U.S.C.A. §§ 15Ir, 1522 (1926). See Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and
the Ansell Army Articles, 29 Yale L. J. 52, 60-62 (X919). Manual for Courts-Martial 73, 79
(U.S. Army 1928).
2 The court-martial stated: "But, notwithstanding this finding, the Court deems it to be
its duty to state its belief that in thus ordering the retrial of an accused without his request or
consent, [it] establishes .... a departure so at variance with military law and custom, as to
be dangerous, and which possibly is not in strict accord with the 4oth Article of War and the
Vth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
3 Decision unreported.
4 ii5 F. (2d) 435 (C.C.A. 5 th i94o). As an alternative holding the court also stated that
since the question was not one concerning the jurisdiction of the court-martial, the civil courts
should not consider the matter; but the court continued to discuss the issue at great length.

See note 15 infra.
1cClaughry v. Deming, i86 U.S. 49 (1902) (writ granted because court-martial composed
M

of officers of the regular army tried an officer of the volunteer army in violation of Article of
War 78); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 (1866) (writ granted because military authorities
had tried civilian citizen not under their statutory jurisdiction, and in violation of his constitutional right of trial by jury).
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findings to conform with the evidence.6 But the reviewing authority was said to have
no power to disapprove of the court-martial's sentence or findings and to order a new
trial without the express consent of the accused. Complete disapproval of a sentence
was said to be tantamount to an acquittal.7 In the present case the court sought to
avoid this difficulty by assuming that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death could
be presumed to consent to a new trial where such new trial appeared as a condition of
the disapproval of the sentence.
An amendment to the Articles of War, passed subsequent to the court-martial
trials in the instant litigation, gives express statutory authority for ordering a new
trial.8 There appears to be no great doubt as to the constitutionality of the amendment under the provision against double jeopardy. The amendment expressly provides that there may be no second trial after an acquittal and that there may be no
heavier sentence imposed in a later trial than was imposed in the first one; there is,
therefore, no danger of abusing the power by ordering new trials until a result satisfactory to the reviewing authority has been obtained.9 Since revision upward of a sentence by the original court or the reviewing court has never been held unconstitutional,o it may be argued that a new trial, with a safeguard against imposition of a higher
sentence, is likewise constitutional. Moreover, the procedure set up in the statute provides safeguards against double jeopardy which are closely analogous to those afforded
by the federal civil court rule that "jeopardy attaches upon the arraignment of the defendant and the impanelling of the jury."x The decision of a court-martial cannot be
executed without approval or confirmation of the reviewing authority;-2 refusal to ap6Article of War 5o, 39 Stat. 658 (1916). Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 454
(2d ed. 1920); Manual for Courts-Martial 75 (U.S. Army 1928). See Morgan, The Existing
Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 Yale L. J. 52, 6i, 62 (rgig), where
the distinction is made between the legitimate procedure of changing the findings or sentence
without a new trial and the apparently unauthorized revision upon a retrial. See Swaim v.
United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Ex parte Reed, o0 U.S. 13 (1879).
7Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 451 (2d ed. 1920); In re Liesendahl, 26 Ops.
Att'y Gen'l 239 (i9o7). But cf. Digest of the Opinions of the Judge Advocate Gen'l 347 (1914).

Consent of the accused to disapproval and a new trial removes the objection of double
jeopardy. i Ops. Att'y Gen'l 233 (i818); Ex parte Costello, 8 F. (2d) 386 (D.C. Va. 1925);
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 453 (2d ed. 1920).
8Article of War 5o2, 41 Stat. 797 (1920), ioU.S.C.A. § I522 (1926).
9This fear has been expressed in Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 260 n.65 (2d ed.
Bruce, Double Jeopardy and Courts-Martial, 3 Minn. L. Rev. 484 (igig), where it is
pointed out that in 1918 alone there were fourteen cases in which the court-martial's original
findings of acquittal were disapproved by the reviewing authority, and the action was sent back
to the same court and revised, resulting in a conviction. But these apparently were all cases in
which the reviewing authority exercised his statutory power to send the sentence and findings
back to the same court for revision, a procedure which Bruce probably confused with the
non-existent procedure of ordering a new trial.
10See Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Ex parte Reed, ioo U.S. 13 (1879).
Revision upward is no longer permitted since the amendment in 1920 of Article of War 40.
1920);

41 Stat. 795, io U.S.C.A. § 1511 (1926).

-Clark, Handbook of Criminal Procedure 443 (2d ed. 1918); Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.
(2d) 240 (App. D.C. 1939); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F. (2d) 640 (C.C.A. ioth 1936).
- Article of War 46, 41 Stat. 796 (1920), io U.S.C.A. § i517 (1926); Article of War 48,
41 Stat. 796 (1920), ioU.S.C.A. § 1519 (1926); Manual for Courts-Martial 73, 79 (U.S. Army
1928).
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prove or confirm therefore presents a situation analogous to that of a "hung jury" in an
ordinary criminal case, in which situation it is held that jeopardy has not attached.'3
The new provisions against imposition of a higher sentence in a later trial make it
possible to presume that the defendant consents to a new trial, in much the same manner as does a defendant in an ordinary criminal trial who appeals his case.14 The safeguards afforded by the amended Articles of War were not, of course, operative at the
time of the courts-martial in the instant litigation, but the fact that the procedure followed was in accordance with that later provided for by the amendment gives some
justification for the court's holding that there was no double jeopardy.
A more significant aspect of the present case is found in the fact that the court, although denying that it had the power to inquire into the constitutional issue of double
jeopardy, devoted the major part of its opinion to discussing the merits of the case.xs
This deviation from the general rule that denial of the constitutional safeguards is not
such a jurisdictional defect as can be raised on petition for habeas corpus,' 6 is, it would
seem, a salutary tendency. So long as the army is made up of professional soldiers, it
may be permissible to allow the court-martial system conclusively to determine the
meaning of constitutional provisions. Where, however, the personnel of the army is
largely conscript, it is arguable that the constitutional safeguards should mean the same
thing to the citizen soldier as to the citizen civilian. At the very least, the same reviewing courts should have an opportunity to consider the effect to be given to the diverse
considerations affecting the civil and the military organizations. The fact that the
writ of habeas corpus is a jurisdictional writ would not appear to be a serious bar to the
exercise of review by the federal courts; it has elsewhere been held that, where habeas
corpus is the only practicable method of obtaining enforcement of constitutional pro7
visions, it will be so used.
X3United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 579 (1824); Logan v. United States, x44 U.S.
263 (r892); cf. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (189i). But see Morgan, The Existing
Court-Martial System and the AnseU Army Articles, 29 Yale L. J. 52, 62 (I919), stating,

in defense of the practice of sending sentences and findings back to the same court for revision:
"The relation of court to jury does not now, and did not, at the time of the adoption of our
constitution or at any other time, exist, between the appointing authority and the courtmartial; and no sound argument can be based upon so false an analogy."
'4 Stroud v. United States, 253 U.S. 15 (i919); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
15"Notwithstanding the hesitation of the court about the plea, it was a court and decided it.
There was no lack of judicial atmosphere or of the aid and advice of counsel. The plea having
been regularly urged and overruled, the district court probably ought not to have attempted
to retry its merits.
"Nevertheless, in view of the high nature of the constitutional right said to have been invaded, a violation of which by the sentence of any courts, it is urged, will render imprisonment under it illegal, we too will re-examine it." Sanford v. Robbins, ii5 F. (2d) 435, 437
(C.C.A. 5 th 1940)-

X6Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333 (1923); Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924). But cf. Bens v.
United States, 266 Fed. 152 (C.C.A. 2d 1920), cert. den. sub nom. Bens v. Power, 254 U.S. 634
(1920).
17 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937) (habeas granted after conviction in federal criminal
court on ground that, petitioner not having had such legal aid as to enable him to effect an
appeal, habeas corpus is the only means by which his constitutional rights can be safeguarded);
Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

